I. INTRODUCTION CONSIDER a collection of n processes, each possessing a previously initialized local variable message. Desired is an agreement protocol whose execution results in the same value being assigned to the message variables of all processes. Some processes may not obey the protocol for its entire duration. In fact, these processes may actively attempt to hinder agreement. We call any process that deviates from the protocol malicious. Those processes that strictly adhere to the protocol for its entire execution are deemed proper. Because we can not constrain the behavior of malicious processes, we require only that all proper processes agree on their message values upon termination.
A Byzantine Agreement protocol is an agreement protocol with the additional constraint that if the protocol commences with the same value V in the message variables of all proper 0098-5589/85/0600-0539$01.00 © 1985 IEEE processes, then V is the value agreed upon on termination. Byzantine Agreement has been extensively studied [1] , [2] , [4] - [7] and is widely considered to be a fundamental problem of distributed computing. For example, an application may be replicated on several processors in order to achieve fault-tolerance. A Byzantine Agreement protocol could be used to guarantee that all proper processors take the same action.
In this paper, we present a Byzantine Agreement protocol based on a model of computation first proposed by Rabin (8] .
The protocol proceeds as a repetition of phases. (A phase is defined to be the interval in which the processes exchange message values.) If we iterate for a fixed number of phases, then there is a nonzero probability of disagreement upon termination. However, we can make this probability arbitrarily small. We may choose instead to iterate indefinitely so that the protocol terminates only when agreement has been reached. Termination occurs with probability 1. Specifically, we shall prove correct a protocol for n processes where no more than t are malicious. When the collection of processes is asynchronous, n must be at least 6t + 1. With minor modifications, the same protocol is correct for a system of n > 3t + 1 synchronous processes.
Rabin's protocol allows the message values to be drawn from an arbitrary universe. The approach adopted in this paper is to first present a solution in which the message values are single bits and then give a method for converting such a solution into one where the values may be drawn from an arbitrary universe. Our technique of converting a binary Byzantine Agreement protocol to one that works for arbitrary values is independent of the model of computation used in this paper.
A. Notational Conventions
The following notational conventions are used throughout this paper in order to eliminate ambiguity when it arises. 1) All variables local to process Pi are subscripted with i.
2) A variable is siipersciipted with R to indicate the value assigned to it in phase R. Superscript 0 is used to denote an initial value, that is, one set prior to invocation of the protocol.
Thus messagei is the value assigned to process Pi's message variable in phase R.
II. THE MODEL
The model used in this paper is adapted from one previously proposed by Rabin [8] . Differences arise only in the proportion of faulty processes tolerated (ours is resilient to more failures) and the absence of an authenticated message system. Rabin's model is briefly described.
A. Shared Secrets
The distinguishing characteristic of Rabin's model is its reliance on shared randomly chosen values. Using Shamir's technique for sharing secrets (10] , any set of t + 1 or more processes may cooperate to uncover a bit, randomly chosen in advance by a "dealer." We briefly describe the technique.
Embedded as data into the protocol executed by process Pi are "pieces" of N secrets. Let pT denote the piece of the mth secret embedded in process Pi. When combined with any t other pieces of the mth secret, a unique bit is revealed to Pi.
Let ComputeSecret be the function that maps t + 1 pieces of a secret into the secret itself. Before the Byzantine Agreement protocol is first run, a "dealer" choses N bits b1, -* *, bN at random. Each bit bm is used to derive n pieces p, * Pn with piece pm being distributed to process Pi. By cooperating with t other processes, any process is able to discover bm. Therefore this method allows all processes to agree on a value.
To ensure that a malicious process does not supply an invalid piece of a secret, the "dealer" signs each, thereby rendering it unforgeable. Let sm = DealersSignature ((pT, m) represent the signed piece of the mth secret given to processP1. (Note: The second component allows a process to verify that a piece received from another process is, in fact, part of the mth secret.) Signatures may be obtained by using a publickey cryptosystem [9] .
B. The Message System
For ease of explanation, a message p is considered to be a tuple with the following elements. In the case of asynchronous processes, consider n > 6t + 1 and C = L(n + 2t)/2]. For systems of n > 3t + 1 synchronous processes, let C = t(n + t)/21 .
We again emphasize that this algorithm works for the case where message values are drawn from the set {O,1}. Subsequently we will present a method for using this algorithm to reach agreement on values drawn from an arbitrary universe.
IV. CORRECTNESS
The correctness of ByzantineAgreement is proved in this section. We begin with some definitions that will facilitate elaboration of the proof.
Definition: The configuration at time R of a system of processes is the collection of values in the message variables of proper processes at the start of phase R (i.e., the (n -t) values assigned to the message variables of proper processes during phase,R -1).
A proper configuration is a configuration in which all proper processes have the same message value. Definition: A configuration at time R is biased toward V if it contains tin excess of (C -t) message values equal to V. V is called the bias of the configuration.
Note that a configuration of asynchronous processes need not be biased. However, when a bias exists, it is unique. Definition: We say that proper process Pi is forced to Vduring phase R if count<(V) > C.
We begin the proof by introducing several useful lemmas. First, we prove that, in any phase, a prOper process may be forced only to the bias (if it exists) of the configuration at the phase's start. Lemma 4.1: A process can be forced to V during phase R only if V is the bias of the configuration at time R.
Proof: Suppose process Pi is forced to V during phase R. Then, Pi received value V from at least (C + 1) processes during phase R. Because there are at most t malicious processes, the configuration contains at least (C + 1 -t) processes with message value V. Thus, V is the bias. O
The next lemma shows that the shared secrets are not revealed prematurely.
Lemma -4.2: -The mth shared secret bit bm can not be discovered by any process (whether malicious or not) until the (potential) bias of the configuration at time m is fixed.
Proof: The Lemma follows trivially when the procesges are synchronous. Consider the asynchronous case. Fot the mth secret to become known, at least one proper process Pi must reveal its piece. This it does only after terminating the ExchangeMessageValues step of phase m. Included in the values received by Pi during this step is a set S of -at least (n -2t) messages sent by proper processes. Let V be the majority value in S. Even if the (at most) t proper processes not in S have value V, the number of proper processes beginning phase m with message value V is insufficient to bias the configuration at time m toward V (since I(n -2t)/21 + t < C -t Correctness of the protocol has now been proved. We have shown that, with great probability, an improper initial configuration will not remain so indefinitely. (By Theorem 4.3, the probability that an initially improper configuration is still not proper after R phases is 1 -2-R. Thus, the probability of agreement tends toward 1 as R increases.) It has also been shown (Lemma 4.5) that once a configuration has been made proper it will never return to an improper state. Finally, Corollary 4.6 demonstrates that when the initial configuration is proper with V as its only value, then V is the message value ultimately decided upon by all proper processes. Therefore, we have proven the following. V. AN ALGORITHM FOR A SYSTEM OF n > 3t +1 SYNCHRONOUS PROCESSES In this section we prove the correctness of the protocol for a system of n > 3t + 1 synchronous processes.
The synchronous protocol differs from the asynchronous version in the number of messages received by ExchangeT and in the value of C. In an asynchronous system, requiring proper processes to wait for more than (n -t) messages gives the malicious processes a means of foiling agreement. That is, by never sending messages, they cause proper processes to wait indefinitely. However, there is no such worry in synchronous systems. We simply ignore any process that has not communicated by the phase's end. Synchrony means that, during each phase, a proper process receives the message values of all proper processes. This enables us to tolerate more malicious processes than in an asynchronous system.
Correctness of the protocol for a system of n > 3t + 1 synchronous processes is proved in a manner almost identical to the one-used for the asynchronous system. Only the proof of Theorem 4.4 needs to be changed to reflect the fact that n > 3t+1. With this change, the correctness of the protocol for synchronous sytems follows from the proof of the asynchronous protocol.
Theorem 5.2: Consider a system of n > 3t + 1 synchronous processes with at most t faulty. Then ByzantineAgreement is correct.
VI. REACHING AGREEMENT ON ARBITRARY VALUES
In this section, we present a method whereby any correct algorithm for Byzantine Agreement on a binary valued message may be converted to one that reaches agreement on a value from an arbitrary universe. 1 The method is independent of Rabin's model or that of this paper.
Let ByzantineAgreement denote any correct protocol for achieving Byzantine Agreement on a binary-valued message. To achieve multivalued agreement, our solution (Fig. 2) interposes additional phases Cnvtl and Cnvt2 between phases 0 and 1 of the binary protocol. For these two phases, consider
A. Correctness ofMultivalued ByzantineAgreement The correctness of MultiValuedByzantineAgreement is now proved. We begin by observing that the bias of a configuration is still wells-defined even if the message values are not single bits. It is clear that a configuration has at most one bias and that this is the only value to which a proper process may be forced during the conversion phases. (Proof of the preceding claim is nearly identical to the one used in Lemma 4.1.) The intuition behind our method is that the initial bias becomes a potential final message value only if it is known by all processes. This is formalized in the theorem which follows. It will be useful to first state a lemma which we prove correct both for asynchronous (n > 6t + 1) and synchronous (n > 3t + 1) systems of processes. A necessary and sufficient condition for terminating the algorithm is presented in the Appendix. In that section we prove that the termination condition becomes true by an expected one additional phase after agreement has been reached. Therefore the algorithm for reaching agreement on a single bit has an expected running time of three phases.
If agreement on values drawn from an arbitrary universe is desired, then ConvertToBinaryCnvt and ConvertToBinaryC?flt2 may be executed at the cost of two additional phases.
VIII. DISCUSSION
As was previously mentioned, the distinguishirg characteristic of the model is the use of shared secrets. A predistribution of "pieces" of these secrets by a reliable dealer is required. One may question how realistic an assumption this is.
The motivating factor behind the use of shared secrets is a result proving the impossibility of agreement in asynchronous systems with even very restrictive failures [3] By using shared secrets, the impossibility is circumvented. Additionally, because of the declining cost of memory, it may be practical in some situations to predistribute a large number of random bits. Hence, at least for collections of asynchronous processors, the assumption may not be altogether unrealistic. APPENDIX DETECTING AGREEMENT Rabin's paper describes a procedure CloseFinish which runs in parallel with the agreement protocol and causes its termination. We can adapt this procedure to accomplish the same ends (i.e., determining which phase is last) at the cost of requiring Proof: By Theorem 9.6 and Theorem 9.5. 0
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